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In Washington v. Davis,' the United States Supreme Court es-
tablished the principle that public acts and laws having a racially
disproportionate impact2 violate the equal protection clause only
when discriminatory intent is found.3 By the age of the precedent
marshalled in support of its decision,4 the Court implied that the
intent requirement was not new to the equal protection area, but
rather that a long-existing rule5 merely had been clarified. Although
use of the intent rule is now firmly established, the Court has yet to
articulate its purpose. 6 While discussion continues concerning what
** B.A. 1975, Brown University; J.D. 1979, Case Western Reserve Law School; Associ-
ate, Pierson, Ball & Dowd, Washington, D.C.
1. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). While the Court used the term "purpose" rather than "intent"
in Davis, the words have been used interchangeably since the Court's reference to both in
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), as distinguishing de facto from de jure
segregation. Id at 208.
2. Disproportionate impact should be understood as that condition that occurs when a
greater portion of one identifiable group is burdened or is more greviously burdened than
another identifiable group. The term "disproportionate impact" is preferable to its cognate,
"discriminatory impact," because the latter is conclusionary in presuming that discrimination
has occurred. The Court in Davis, to the contrary, held that a discrimination is not implied
routinely from disproportionate impact. 426 U.S. at 240-41.
Discriminatory impact is also said to carry a perjorative connotation that confuses the
issue of whether an action has a disproportionate impact or effect, with whether a dispropor-
tionate impact is justifiable. See Vulcan Soc'y of N.Y. City Fire Dep't, Inc. v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 490 F.2d 387, 391 n.4 (2d Cir. 1973).
3. First the Court states the rule negatively as: "[Olur cases have not embraced the
proposition that a law or other official act . . . is unconstitutional solely because it has a ra-
cially disproportionate impact," 426 U.S. at 239, and then affirmatively refers to: "[Tihe basic
equal protection principle that the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discrimina-
tory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose." Id. at 240. See generally
Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term - Forward- In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Princile,
90 HARv. L. REV. 1(1976).
4. See Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945), and Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303
(1879), citedin Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
5. See 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 3 (1881) (author traces the use of intent to
Anglo-Saxon law predating the reign of William the Conqueror).
6. See The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REV. 70, 174 (1977).
is necessary to constitute discriminatory intent,7 little attention has
been directed to the impact of intent analysis on equal protection
jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court's insistence on intent as an essential compo-
nent of equal protection violations suggests that the Court has in-
fused the law of equal protection with common-law attributes. More
specifically, the scope of the remedies the Court will grant to redress
an equal protection violation appears limited by the common-law
aspects of intent analysis. This constraint on the Court's exercise of
remedial power is significant in understanding the Court's treatment
of equal protection claims in areas ranging from school desegrega-
tion and land use to legislative districting and jury selection. The
Court's use of intent analysis may explain how its posture differs
with each kind of equal protection claim.
II. The Jurisprudence of Intent
A. Common-Law Intent
Intent is a psychological concept. When characterized as the
mental state essential to voluntary action, intent has behavioral sig-
nificance.' It functions as an element in rules of criminal and tort
law upon which culpability and liability often depend.9 In both
fields, intent performs two services. First, it links someone to a par-
ticular wrongful act, identifying him as a wrongdoer. Second, intent
measures the amount of wrongdoing by assessing how much some-
one was at fault.
1. Role of Intent in Identifying the Wrongdoer. -Intent is im-
portant in establishing a nexus between cognition and the act. In the
classic case of Garrat v. Dailey,"° for example, a boy who pulled
away a chair just as plaintiff attempted to sit down was held liable
for battery because he knew that she was substantially certain to fall
to the ground. The court inferred the intent that gave rise to liability
from the boy's knowledge of the likelihood of the impending fall.
Proof that the boy expected or should have expected the fall estab-
lished his responsibility for the act of pulling away the chair and
causing the plaintiff injury." Absent proof of the nexus between the
boy and the act causing the injury, the boy would have been free
7. See, e.g., Note, Finding Intent in School Segregation Constitutional Violations, 28
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 119 (1977).
8. 0. HOLMES, supra note 5, at 91; Cook, Act, Intention and Motive in the Criminal Law,
26 YALE L.J. 644, 646 (1917).
9. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW 197 (1972); W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF
TORTS 31 (4th ed. 1971).
10. 46 Wash. 2d 197, 279 P.2d 1091 (1955).
11. Id at 202, 279 P.2d at 1094.
from any liability for injury to the plaintiff. The boy's knowledge of
the impending fall linked him legally to the act causing the fall. The
relationship between the defendant's mental state and the act, as
measured by the element of intent, created the boy's liability for the
consequences of the act. Thus, intent is useful to ascertain the fault
of the actor.
It must be noted, however, that the court recognized that with-
out knowledge of the imminence of plaintiffs fall, defendant would
not have committed a wrongful act.12 Below a certain threshold
level of intent, the act may be sufficiently remote from the actor's
volition to not warrant liability or culpability. In this first capacity,
intent serves to measure an actor's mental proximity to an act the
consequences of which violate a law.
2 Role of Intent in Measuring the Degree of Fault. -As part of
the assessment of an actor's responsibility for an injury, the element
of intent may determine if the actor is to be subject to burdensome
sanctions. Because of the harsh sanctions that may be imposed upon
a finding of fault, intent operates in its second capacity as a method
of assessing the magnitude of the fault. 3 Different degrees of will-
fulness correspond to differing levels of intent and grades of wrong-
doing.' 4 Usually the greater the degree of intent proved, the more
severe the punishment imposed."5 In this second capacity, the deter-
mination of intent ensures that the sanction is commensurate with
the degree of wrongdoing; that those whose acts are most heinous are
most severely punished.' 6
B. Analysis in Equal Protection Jurisprudence
Specific consequences follow from a finding of intent in com-
mon law. Well-defined modes of analysis for ascertaining intent
have evolved in criminal and tort law, yielding results that also are
well detailed.'7 In contrast, neither the use of intent analysis nor the
consequences of finding intent are clear in the equal protection area.
The equal protection clause has been interpreted as mandating that
12. Id
13. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 167 (1964).
14. See Bauer, The Degree Of Moral FaultAsAffecting Defendant's Liability, 81 U. PA. L.
REV. 586 (1933).
Murder, for instance, differs from manslaughter largely in the extent to which intent is
proved. Compare W. LAFAVE & A. Scorr, supra note 9, at 534, with id at 571. For excep-
tions, see id at 572.
15. Id at 21-24.
16. Id at 252.
17. Nonetheless, much discretion remains in the decision to charge, and evaluation of
evidence proving the commission of crimes and torts has not achieved scientific certainty. See
Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE, & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE chs. 11, 12 & 14
(1971); W. PROSSER, supra note 9, at chs. 6 & 7. The procedures for the pursuit of a claim or
charge, however, are well defined and the outcomes are clearly categorized.
people similarly situated be treated similarly under the law. 8 The
language of the clause implies no norm of equality to which courts
may look for guidance.' 9 Yet violations of the equal protection
clause are defined in terms of deviation from this indefinite standard
of equality.2° The crux of equal protection analysis lies in determin-
ing how much deviation constitutes a denial of equal protection. 2'
Any law or official act that does not apply to all people invites a
classification. Inevitably, the benefits and burdens of the law are ap-
portioned among those within and without the class. Equal protec-
tion analysis is an evaluation of the legitimacy of the differing
treatment accorded by the law or act.22
18. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
19. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1880). Since people are not equal in
all respects, they need not always be treated equally. It is necessary to determine in what
respects people are similar and which of these respects are relevant to the treatment they
should receive under the law. The courts, in their determination of relevant similarities, have
resorted to "empirical realities" in adopting a value system that ranks similarities and differ-
ences in order of their importance to the court's jurisprudence. See J. WILSON, EQUALITY 188-
89 (1880). The Supreme Court adopted such a value system in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954), for example, when it determined that "education is perhaps the most impor-
tant function of state and local governments." Id at 493. Because the Court concluded that
"[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal," it found that the plaintiffs had been
"deprived of the equal protection of the laws .. d.." I  at 495.
20. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970). The absence of a standard of
equality arises in part from the influence of Locke's thoughts on the early development of
our law. Flatham, Equality and Generalization, A FormalAnalysi, in EQUALITY, IX NoMos
38, 49 (1967). Locke posited that equality existed in a state of nature in which mere survival is
the objective. Thus, equality exists as the status quo, and the impact of civilization causes
aberrant inequalities. No theory of equality is necessary; it just exists aprior As an early
statement of this natural equality perspective in American culture, see Declaration of Indepen-
dence. "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal. ... Equal-
ity, the theory portends, would exist in the absence of government. See Note, Developments-
Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1165 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Developments].
21. Developments, supra note 20, at 1172.
In Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972), for example, the Court found a prima
facie case of discrimination because "the opportunity for discrimination was present and [it
cannot be said] on this record that it was not resorted to by commissioners." Id. at 632 (quot-
ing Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 552 (1967) (brackets in original)). This "opportunity for
discrimination," coupled with the marked disproportionate impact of the selection procedure
of excluding blacks from the jury, created a heavily burdened presumption of invidious dis-
crimination that the state failed to rebut. Id at 630-32. Intent was established by the racial
designation required by both the interview questionnaire and the filed information card, which
together "provided a clear and easy opportunity for racial discrimination." Id at 630. Strict
scrutiny was therefore appropriate. The statistical improbability of a racially neutral selection
process yielding an all white grand jury in a city in which twenty-four percent of the popula-
tion was black created the prima facie case of invidious discrimination. Id at 629.
The Court, in overturning the conviction, did not dispute the Louisiana Supreme Court's
finding that the all white jury resulted from coincidence and not purposeful exclusion. 225 La.
941, 951, 233 So. 2d 891, 894 (1970). Instead, the Court found that the use of racial indicia was
sufficient to constitute evidence of discriminatory intent. Evidence sufficient to satisfy the Lou-
isiana Supreme Court that no pattern of exclusion of blacks from juries existed, id., and testi-
mony by the trial court clerk that the jury selection was made without consideration of race, id
at 952, 233 So. 2d at 895, failed to rebut the presumption that strict scrutiny was required.
22. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
I. Strict Scrutiny or Rational Relationsho. -Differences in the
rigor of a court's evaluation between mere rationality 23 and strict
scrutiny 24 depend on the presence of evidence that stricter scrutiny is
warranted. When, for example, racial considerations are implicated
in the passage of a law or in an official act, stricter scrutiny is justi-
fied. In Washington v. Davis, 26 a police qualifying examination
was challenged as a denial of equal protection based on evidence
that a greater proportion of blacks than whites failed to perform sat-
isfactorily on the exam. The Davis decision is significant because it
held that the mere disproportionate impact of a law on a class of
people of a certain race is not sufficient to warrant strict scrutiny.
Discriminatory intent must also be shown.27
The intent rule serves to allocate the burden of proof in a case
concerning an alleged equal protection violation. Judicial inquiry
may be prompted by a claim that a law operates to the "comparative
disadvantage" of the class of claimants.2 8  After the decision in
Washington v. Davis, however, discriminatory intent must be shown
in order for a court to invoke strict scrutiny.29 Although the quan-
tum of rigor by which strict scrutiny exceeds normal scrutiny is un-
clear, the former clearly warrants much closer examination.3"
23. Legislation is constitutional when the differential treatment accorded by the law
bears a rational relation to a permissible objective. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 732-33
(1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1955).
24. When "suspect classes" of people are the subject of legal classification or a "funda-
mental interest" is abridged by the impact of a law, a closer relationship is required between a
compelling state interest and the purpose of the statute. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,
196 (1964); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
25. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
26. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
27. See text accompanying notes 1-3 supra.
28. Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach To The Problem Of Unconstitutional Legis-
lative Motive, in 1971 SuP. CT. REV. 95, 107 (P. Kurland ed.). While a court will review a law
or act that disproportionately affects one group, "[i]f the classification has some 'reasonable
basis,' it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification 'is not made with
mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.'" Dandridge v. Wil-
liams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
29. 426 U.S. at 241-42. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). Cf. Brest,
supra note 28. Professor Brest suggests that strict scrutiny is self-operating. "The extraordi-
nary justification required in these and similar kinds of cases is not contingent upon a finding
of illicit motivation . . . . [Tihe criterion [of race for example] itself initiates the demand for
an extraordinary justification." Id at 108 (footnotes omitted). He notes, however, that laws
which do not facially affect a suspect class or infringe a fundamental interest may still trigger
strict scrutiny if race plays an operative role, id at 109, as it sometimes does in a showing of
intent.
While Professor Brest's analysis of the operation of strict scrutiny may be theoretically
accurate, see United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), it fails to
account practically for the problem of proving that race, for example, entered into the formu-
lation of a law or motivated a public act. Indeed, in the absence of a showing of discrimina-
tory intent, the Court in Washington v. Davis found the standard of strict scrutiny inapplicable
and that no prima facie case or invidious discrimination existed. Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 241 (1976). The Court then, if not before, held evidence of discriminatory intent
requisite to the application of strict scrutiny. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189,
208 (1973).
30. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
Plaintiffs are more likely to successfully challenge the constitutional-
ity of a law or act when a court applies strict scrutiny than when it
does not.3 '
In theory, strict scrutiny merely causes the burden of proof to
shift.32 In practice, strict scrutiny nearly assures victory to the plain-
tiffs by heavily burdening the state's defense of its law or act. Since
the presence of intent vel non dictates the level of scrutiny to be ap-
plied, a finding of intent is almost determinative of the result.
2. Motivation and Nexus. -Although the disposition of a case
may hinge on proof of discriminatory intent, it remains unclear what
evidence of discrimination suffices to establish this intent. Two ma-
jor hurdles arise in ascertaining intent. The first is finding discrimi-
natory motivation. The second is establishing a nexus between
discriminatory motivation and an official act or law. Once these two
requirements are satisfied, discriminatory intent is proved and strict
scrutiny invoked. While the meaning of "motive" and "intent" dif-
fer little in common parlance,33 they are considered distinct in equal
protection analysis.
(a) Motivation. -Motivation, suggests one commentator, satis-
fies the question: "Why did the decisionmaker make a particular
decision?"34 Thus, motivation "focuses on the process by which a
rule was adopted. . . .,3 In contrast, intent serves as a term of art
and is conclusory. In practical terms, the Davis decision and its
progeny36 use the word "intent" to indicate a knowing or deliberate
state of mind that, because of its manifestation in a law or public act,
31. The significance of strict scrutiny, as noted in the Davis opinion, 426 U.S. 229, 241
(1976), was established by the Court in Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972), in which
the conviction of a black man was overturned because grand jury selection procedures were
determined to have been discriminatory. The Alexander Court stated that when applying
strict scrutiny, the "burden of proof shifts to the State to rebut the presumption of unconstitu-
tional action by showing that permissible racially neutral selection criteria and procedures
have produced the monochromatic result." 1d at 632.
32. The mere "rationality" requirement imposed under minimum scrutiny, in contrast,
amounts to judicial deference to the state and presents a hurdle that plaintiffs are unlikely to
overcome. See McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969); Developments,
supra note 20, at 1078-81. The extent ofjudicial deference under minimum scrutiny is illus-
trated by an early statement of Chief Justice Warren:
[Tihe States [are permitted] a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect
some groups of citizens differently than others. The constitutional safeguard is of-
fended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement
of the State's objective. . . . A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any
state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
33. Motive is defined as "something within a person... that incites him to action.
while intent is "the state of mind or mental attitude with which an act is done." WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1970).
34. Brest, spra note 28, at I11.
35. Id
36. Eg., Massachusetts v. Feeney, 434 U.S. 884 (1979); Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
triggers strict scrutiny.37 Concern over discriminatory intent is based
on the assumption that this invidious intent will eventually taint the
content of the law.38 Thus, the detection of discriminatory motive
prompts the question whether the resulting official act or law was
improperly influenced. A link between the discriminatory motive
and a law or act creating a suspect classification amounts to proof of
impermissible intent and answers the question of improper influ-
ence. Under present Court interpretation, the proscribed intent
might better be described as "unconstitutional" intent rather than
"discriminatory" intent.39
Proof of discriminatory motivation, however, requires detection
of the wayward motivation. Although some laws may be facially
discriminatory and some public acts bristle with discrimination,
most purport to work neutrally.' Discriminatory motivation is usu-
ally established by deduction. If only permissible factors were con-
sidered in enacting the law, the act would not exist in its present
form. Only the introduction of impermissible motives can account
for the legislative action. Therefore, the Court deems the law to be
motivated by these impermissible considerations. For example, the
Court in Gr!fin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County,4
found a denial of equal protection when county public schools were
closed following a desegregation order, but tuition grants and tax
concessions were provided to support children in private segregated
schools. While the state defended its action on nonracial grounds,
the Court found that "the record. . . could not be clearer that...
37. 426 U.S. 229, 240-41 (1976).
38. For a description of Professor Brest's four reasons for judicial invalidation of laws
motivated by discriminatory purposes, see Brest, supra note 28, at 116-18.
39. A similar characterization was briefly proposed in 1968 in the application of equal
protection analysis to eminent domain. See Note, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1568 (1968). Resolution
of the discrepancy between motivation and intent might be achieved if the terms were recog-
nized as conclusory. Id at 1571. When evidence of state action is not sufficiently clear from
the circumstances to warrant strict scrutiny, the impetus behind an act having a racially dispro-
portionate impact should be called "motive"; when state action is clear, the impetus should be
deemed "intent" and thus reviewable as a violation of the equal protection clause. Id.
40. Rarely will discriminatory motivation appear as blatantly as in the case of Congress-
man William Tuck, who represented not only Southside, Virginia, but also the devout segrega-
tionists. In 1958, he explained his posture toward efforts of neighbors to desegretate: "We
cannot allow Arlington or Norfolk to integrate. If they won't stand with us, I say make them
stand." J. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN 45 (1961) (citing articles that appeared in
the Washington Post and Times Herald, Nov. 15, 1978).
Senator Sam Englehardt, Jr., an Alabama Councilman and legislative spokesman, was
even less subtle in exclaiming that "desegregating the schools will lead to rape!... The nigger
is depraved!" 1d at 38.
Present-day segregationists are not nearly as visible when setting official policy.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in recounting how difficult the detection of discrim-
ination has become, observed that most citizens "would be as reluctant to admit that they have
racial prejudice as to admit that they have no sense of humor." Hart v. Community School
Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37, 50 (2d Cir. 1975). See also United States v. Texas Educ. Agency,
532 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1976), vacated and remandedper curiam sub nort, Austin Indep. School
Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976).
41. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
[the] schools. . . closed. . . for one reason, and one reason only: to
ensure . . . that white and colored children . . . would not, under
any circumstances, go to the same school.
4 2
(b) Nexus. -Proof of impermissible motivation, however, does
not suffice to prove discriminatory intent.43 The bulk of an investi-
gation into intent requires the establishment of the nexus between
the discriminatory motive and the official action.' The nexus is, at
best, tenuous because it requires the finding of a connection between
the two independent events of personal impulse and official action.
According to one commentator, establishment of nexus "depends
more on intuitive and impressionistic inferences" than on systematic
analysis.45 In addition, any unreliability present when an actor's
motives are associated with his support of a public act is com-
pounded when the inquiry shifts to a group of actors. Most laws are
the product of collegial bodies. The collective will of such bodies,
known anthropomorphically as "legislative intent," has long been
distinguished from the motives of their members.46 Individual mo-
tives are naturally mixed and rarely professed.4 7
The decision in Washington v. Davis cast further doubt on the
acceptability of inferring legislative intent from legislators' motives.
By decreeing discriminatory intent to be a necessary element in es-
tablishing an equal protection violation, the Court was forced to re-
consider its decision in Palmer v. Thompson,48 which explicitly
rejected motivation as an element in equal protection analysis. 49 In
Palmer, the Court held that the discriminatory motives of individual
city councilmen of Jackson, Mississippi, could not justify invalida-
tion of an ordinance closing municipal swimming pools in the face of
42. Id at 231. See also Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). In Gomillion, the
Alabama legislature had altered the shape of Tuskegee "from a square to an uncouth twenty-
eight-sided figure," id at 340, with the effect of removing nearly all the black voters and no
white voters from the city limits. The Court set aside the change, finding the facts in the record
"tantamount for all practical purposes to a mathematical demonstration, that the legislation is
solely concerned with segregating white and colored voters by fencing Negro citizens out of
town .. " Id at 341. But see Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 225 (1971) (Justice Black
interpreted Grifn and Gomillion as focusing on "the actual effect of the enactments" rather
than on the motivation of those who created them).
43. Private individuals may engage in discriminatory acts provided they neither directly
thwart governmental efforts to eliminate discrimination nor infringe common-law or statutory
rights generally granted to all citizens. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
When no federal or state action is evident, no constitutional violation exists.
44. This is the fundamental precept of the equal protection clause; "No state shall ...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV.
45. Brest, supra note 28, at 114 n. 104.
46. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 130-31 (1810).
47. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 214 (1962).
48. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
49. Id at 224.
a desegregation order." The Davis decision reconciled adoption of
the discriminatory intent rule with Palmer by interpreting Palmer as
holding "that the legitimate purposes of the ordinance .. were not
open to impeachment by evidence that the councilmen were actually
motivated by racial considerations."'" Thus, discriminatory intent is
necessary to establish a violation of the equal protection clause, but
actual motivations of officials are not considered appropriate evi-
dence of that intent. It can only be concluded that the intent rele-
vant for equal protection analysis "differs from the motivation of
individual decisionmakers."52
The problem of establishing the legal nexus between the dis-
criminatory motive and the official action is further complicated be-
cause discriminatory intent need not result from the "dominant
motive" behind a law or official act. Instead, invidious discrimina-
tion need only be one of the factors that motivated the legislature's
decision. 3 This general rejection of the dominant motive test creates
the risk that any individual's illicit motives might be held to invali-
date a governmental decision otherwise permissible. As Justice Ste-
vens warned in his concurring opinion in Davis: "It is unrealistic
. . . to invalidate otherwise legitimate action simply because an im-
proper motive affected the deliberation of a participant in the deci-
sional process. A law conscripting clerics should not be invalid
because an atheist voted for it."54
Furthermore, it is unclear whose discriminatory motives are rel-
evant to the analysis. The discriminatory motives of school board
members, superintendents, assistant superintendents, and parents
have all been held determinative of the validity of official acts.5
Thus, it may be too easy or too difficult to invalidate laws by relying
on a nexus between the decisionmakers' motives and the substance
of the official act.
5 6
50. Id
51. 426 U.S. at 243.
52. See A. BICKEL, supra, note 47, at 208-16; Hogue, Eastlake and Arlington Heights.-
New Hurdles in Regulating Urban Land Use?, 28 CASE W. RES. L. REV. (1977); Note, Reading
the Mind of the School Board- Segregative Intent and the DeFacto/Delure Distinction, 86 YALE
L.J. 317, 327 (1976). But see Brest, supra note 28, at 99-102, 134 (author urges that motiva-
tional analysis not be totally abandoned).
53. McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276-77 (1973).
54. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (Stevens, J. concurring).
55. Compare United States v. School Dist. of Omaha, 521 F.2d 530, 540 n.20, 544 n.30
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 946 (1975) with Amos v. Board of School Directors, 408 F.
Supp. 765, 809, 819 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
56. The inconsistencies evident from the use of such behavioral inquiries prompted Pro-
fessor Ely to formulate his famous "Case Against Considering Motivation." See Ely, Legisla-
tive And Administrative Motivation In Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970). Rather
than a motivational analysis, Ely prefers his "disadvantageous distinction model" in which a
challenged law or act that creates a certain pattern of impact triggers strict scrutiny. Id at
1208. Inquiry into motivation is only useful when the decisionmaker has made either a "ran-
dom" or a "discretionary choice" so that no pattern exists from which motivation can be in-
ferred. Id at 1261-75, 1281-84. It is questionable, however, how well Ely's model has
Since the nexus between discriminatory motive and invidious
result is frequently difficult to establish, affirmative proof of the ef-
fect of discriminatory motivation is rarely available.57 Conse-
quently, a finding of intent generally must be inferred from
circumstantial evidence.58 Plaintiffs case, however, is difficult to es-
tablish from circumstantial evidence; unless discriminatory motiva-
tion is pronounced, nothing mandates a court's search for illicit
motivation.5 9 Such motivation is difficult to detect, and any reliance
on proof of improper motivation in equal protection analysis is risky
and inconclusive.60
3. Tort Law Principles in Equal Protection Intent. -An effort to
avoid reliance on motivational inquiries by utilizing tort law con-
cepts was rejected by the Supreme Court in Austin Independent
School District v. United States.6 The Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals had adopted the tort law premise that an actor intends the for-
seeable results of his actions.62 The circuit court decided that
discriminatory intent would be evidenced by a showing that racial
imbalance is the natural, probable, and forseeable result of the poli-
withstood the Davis requirement of discriminatory intent. 426 U.S. at 240. The Davis Court,
which made the distinction between disproportionate impact and discriminatory intent, would
likely find Ely's reliance on any pattern of impact unpersuasive.
Other theories have been posited as alternatives to imputing intent to a legislature or
official. See, e.g., Note, supra note 52, at 332-55 suggests a shift in focus from the intent of
individual decisionmakers to "institutional intent," the finding of which turns on an identifica-
tion and evaluation of institutional priorities and policies.
57. United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 532 F.2d 380, 388 (5th Cir. 1976). "Rather
than announce his intention of violating anti-discrimination laws, it is far more likely that the
state official 'will pursue his discriminatory practices in ways that are devious, by methods
subtle and illusive - for we deal with an area in which " 'subtleties of conduct . . . play no
small part.""' Id.
58. Id See also Griffin v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218,
231 (1964); Brest, supra note 28, at 120-21.
59. See, e.g., Higgins v. Board of Educ. of City of Grand Rapids, 508 F.2d 779, 793 (6th
Cir. 1974) ("While it is true that a court may infer such an intent from the circumstances there
is no authority for the proposition that such an intent must be inferred in all cases where
segregated patterns exist in fact. The inference is permissible, not mandatory").
60. Language in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252 (1977), acknowledged that the difficulty of isolating the intent of a legislature from
the individual opinions of its members causes courts to "refrain from reviewing the merits of
their decisions . 1..." d at 265. Nonetheless, the Court maintained that "racial discrimina-
tion is not just another competing consideration. When there is proof that a discriminatory
purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision, this judicial deference is no longer justi-
fied." Id at 265-66. This statement may be sound constitutionally, but it is of little merit
behaviorally. No evidence suggests that racially discriminatory motives are more readily de-
tected than are other motives fashioned by biases lacking constitutional significance. Thus, the
Court's assertion that when there is "proof of discriminatory purpose ... judicial deferrence
is no longer justified" begs the evidentiary issue. The constitutional and evidentiary signifi-
cance of a fact should not be confused with each other.
61. 429 U.S. 990 (1976).
62. United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 532 F.2d 380, 388 (5th Cir. 1976). See W.
PROSSER, supra note 9, at 31, in which the rule of intent was thus stated: "Intent ... extend[s]
not only to those consequences which are desired, but also to those which the actor believes are
substantially certain to follow from what he does."
cies the decisionmakers adopted.63 The intent is inferred from the
act, resulting in the drawing of a nexus. Use of the tort law rule
eliminates the need for a nexus between motives of the deci-
sionmakers and the decision. In Austin, for example, the court found
that segregation that resulted from the neighborhood assignment of
pupils in a school district having ethnically segregated residential
patterns was forseeable and thus unconstitutional. 64  Rather than
search for the motivation behind the evidence of segregation, the
court of appeals reasoned that "[wihen [tort law-based] policy is
used, we may infer that the school authorities have acted with segre-
gative intent. '65 The operation of the tort law rule bypasses the in-
vocation of strict scrutiny by creating a presumption of
unconstitutionality. When plaintiffs establish that segregation is a
forseeable result of a public act or law, an affirmative duty is created
in the defendants to eliminate the segregation "root and branch.
'66
The Supreme Court, however, vacated the judgment and re-
manded Austin for "reconsideration in light of Washington v. Da-
vis. ,,67 The Fifth Circuit, upon remand, understood the Supreme
Court to disapprove of inferring discriminatory intent "solely" from
policies disproportionately affecting people of a suspect class.68
While the court of appeals did not construe the vacate and remand
order as entirely "banishing" the tort rule from equal protection
law, 69 the Supreme Court's action effectively led to the abandonment
of the tort rule as a means of enhancing the sensitivity of equal pro-
tection analysis to discrete discriminatory practices. Indeed, in his
concurrence in Austin, Justice Powell expressed concern that the cir-
cuit court was too ready "to impute to school officials a segregative
intent far more pervasive than the evidence justified."7 ° The effect of
the Supreme Court's action in Austin, despite the Fifth Circuit's ef-
63. 532 F.2d at 388. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Hart
v. Community School Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975), first articulated this tort rule.
The court interpreted the Keyes' references to motivational analysis as dicta, id at 49, and
concluded that a finding of de jure segregation may result from "actions taken, coupled with
omissions made. . . which have the natural and foreseeable consequences of causing educa-
tional segregation." Id at 50.
64. 532 F.2d at 392.
65. id
66. Id Strict scrutiny is unnecessary because it is useful only in evaluating facially neu-
tral acts or laws.
In describing the racially divided school system as the "natural, foreseeable, and avoida-
ble result of creating and maintaining an ethnically segregated school system," 532 F.2d at 392,
the court of appeals suggested that the discrimination was intentional and visible. Since con-
stitutional justifications for discrimination are rare, see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944), foreseeable segregation would almost always result in a constitutional violation.
Hart v. Community School Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37, 51 (2d Cir. 1975). But see United States
v. School Dist. of Omaha, 521 F.2d 530 (8th Cir. 1975).
67. Austin Indep. School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976).
68. United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 564 F.2d 162, 169 (5th Cir. 1977).
69. Id at 168.
70. Austin Indep. School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990, 991 (1976).
forts to salvage the tort rule, is to foreclose the use of simpler, non-
motivational analysis in the detection of invidious discrimination.
Furthermore, the tort rule has been criticized by commentators
as amounting to a proscription of any racial imbalance in public
schools.7 Forseeable segregation that resulted from action as well as
inaction could amount to a constitutional violation.72 Thus, the tort
rule implies that any imbalance that disproportionately burdens
blacks creates an affirmative duty in the decisionmakers to alleviate
the burdens. Failure to adopt policies to alleviate the imbalance is
construed as necessarily and deliberately perpetuating the imbal-
ance.73 This conclusion, inevitably drawn from the use of the tort
rule, clearly conflicts with the statement in Davis that an affirmative
duty to desegretate does not exist unless a prima facie case of invidi-
ous discrimination has been made.
74
Justice Powell in his concurrence, and the Court by its action in
Austin, indicated that the tort rule proves too much. As it has been
interpreted,75 the tort rule obligates the courts to ensure more than
"the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of
race," which the Davis Court held to be the "central purpose of the
Equal Protection Clause."76 Of the two elements of unconstitutional
intent, discriminatory motivation and its nexus to a law that burdens
a suspect class, only the former was absent in the tort rule. The
nexus between a decisionmaker and the burdening law was clearly
present.77 Apparently, evidence of discriminatory motivation is also
necessary.
4. Intent.-Intent remains the threshold requirement that
must be satisfied to obtain strict scrutiny from a reviewing court.
The behavioral significance of the intent requirement is apparent
from the Court's rejection of the tort rule. A nexus must be estab-
lished between a decisionmaker's motivation and the impact of a law
or public act. Intent analysis, however, as it functions in common
law, seems ill-suited to constitutional law. The varying contexts in
71. See Note, Second Circuit Review, 1974-75 Term, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 961, 965-67
(1976); Note, supra note 7, at 140 n.137; Note, supra note 52.
72. See United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 532 F.2d 380, 386 (5th Cir. 1976).
73. See, e.g., Hart v. Community School Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37, 47-49 (2d Cir. 1975)
(court approved district court's finding that the school board's inaction "had the natural and
foreseeable effect of maintaining and perpetuating severe racial imbalance" in the district
schools. The court considered such discrimination, "caused or maintained by state action," to
be de jure segregation).
74. 426 U.S. at 241.
75. See generaly references cited note 71 supra and text accompanying notes 72-74
supra.
76. 426 U.S. at 239.
77. For the rule from which this conclusion was derived, see Austin Indep. School Dist.
v. United States, 429 U.S. 990 (1976), and Hart v. Community School Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d
37 (2d Cir. 1975).
which intent is evaluated account for much of this difference in the
appropriateness of intent analysis.
At common law, intent may be ascertained from circumstantial
evidence by inferring from the prohibited act the actor's state of
mind. In Garralt v. Dailey,78 for example, the Washington Supreme
Court remanded the case for a determination of whether knowledge
of the imminence of plaintiffs fall could be ascertained from the cir-
cumstances in which the injury occurred.7 9 In judging the defend-
ant's liability, the court conducted an evaluation of the relative fault
of the plaintiff and defendant.8" Had the plaintiff in Garratt fallen
unexpectedly, the defendant might have been absolved of responsi-
bility for his coincidental movement of the chair. Therefore, intent
is useful as a means of comparing the parties' mental responsibility
for the injury. The dispute over fault is resolved by a court's finding
that one party evidenced a state of mind that the law defines as suffi-
cient to warrant responsibility for the injury.8' The party proved to
possess the requisite intent is found to be at fault and is assessed the
cost of the injury.
An act that violates the equal protection clause, however, may
be the result of a majority vote of a collegial body in favor of a deci-
sion that disporportionately burdens a suspect class. A court cannot
practically evaluate the state of mind of each member who voted for
the discriminatory action. The multiplicity of actors responsible for
most public decisions makes the detection of an individual's intent
speculative. The actions of school board members, superintendents,
assistant superintendents, voters, and parents,82 in addition to legis-
lators,83 may all be considered in evaluating the constitutionality of
official action. A court, however, will rarely have the opportunity to
hear the decisionmaker explain the purpose of an official action.
Such judicial inquiry into legislative motivation has been considered
a substantial breach of the separation of powers since the decision of
Fletcher v. Peck. 84 Thus, placing a decisionmaker on the witness
stand is usually to be avoided.85
Furthermore, the public decisions that collectively burden a sus-
pect class disproportionately are often really a web of events not eas-
ily separated for purposes of establishing a legal nexus. The actions
78. 46 Wash. 2d 197, 279 P.2d 1091 (1955).
79. Id at 202, 279 P.2d at 1094.
80. Id at 201, 279 P.2d at 1093.
81. See W. PROSSER, supra note 9, at 16-20, 139-43, 439-41.
82. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
83. See A. BICKEL, supra note 47, at 208-21; 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2371
(McNaughten ed. 1961); Tussman & ten-Broek, The EqualProtection ofthe Laws, 37 CALIF. L.
REV. 341, 356-61 (1949).
84. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 130-31 (1810).
85. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971).
of predecessor school boards, for example, may be considered in de-
termining the cause of the disproportionate impact. 86 In addition to
the numerous decisions made by a body of sitting legislators, a court
may also consider the legislators' prior actions and those of their
predecessors in detecting a nexus between the actors' motivation and
the segregation. The number of decisions a court may be required to
scrutinize is astronomical. Thus, proof of discriminatory intent by
such means is impractical and unlikely to be a sound and accurate
guide.
Nevertheless, the holding of Washington v. Davis seems to have
foreclosed other available avenues for detecting intent. Dispropor-
tionate impact alone is insufficient to establish a constitutional viola-
tion.87 Moreover, by its decision in Austin, the Court appears to
have also rejected the tort standard of inferring intent from what is
forseeable to the reasonable person as being overly inclusive.8 8 Ap-
parently, only the most egregious instances of discrimination will be
sufficiently manifest to satisfy the Court's common-law intent formu-
lation. Consequently, the threshold of intent necessary to constitute
a violation of the equal protection clause exceeds that necessary for
tort liability or, in some instances, criminal culpability.
Furthermore, proof of intent is necessary to trigger strict scru-
tiny. Unlike proof of intent at common law, which results in a find-
ing of fault, evidence of intent in constitutional law only initiates
stricter scrutiny. The Court's conclusion that only the most apparent
forms of discrimination constitute intent, however, obviates the need
for strict scrutiny. Such extreme discrimination might be apparent
under even minimal scrutiny. Thus, intent analysis serves to estab-
lish the state's involvement in an action that, a court concludes, de-
prived a suspect class of its right to equal protection of the laws.
Finding a denial of equal protection, which turns largely on whether
strict scrutiny is applied, however, requires sufficient evidence of dis-
criminatory motivation to make strict scrutiny unnecessary. Thus,
86. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 211 (1973). But see Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1970), in which it was suggested that at some
point the effect of past discriminatory acts on the present disproportionate impact becomes so
attenuated that the former becomes irrelevant in the evaluation of the latter. Cf Keyes v.
School Dist. No. 1, 521 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1066 (1976), in which
Chief Judge Seth, in his concurrence, further belittled the importance of antecedent behavior
in detecting discriminatory intent on the present.
On this intent matter. . . it must be observed that school boards come and go,
and there is little if any continuity of policy on any subject as the old members leave
and new ones are elected. The records here clearly demonstrates this. School policy
cannot be a continuing one over a long period and should not be; this after all is the
reason for elections.
Id at 488.
87. 426 U.S. at 240. See notes 67-70 supra.
88. See notes 61-71 and accompanying text supra.
the intent analysis becomes circular since it begs the question of dis-
criminatory motivation that it was designed to ask.
Under the Supreme Court's application in equal protection,
common-law intent analysis, which is used to ascertain whether a
nexus exists between a mental state and an act, presumes the answer
to the question it asks. Therefore, it is of little procedural value to
the Court.
III. Use of Intent in Equal Protection Jurisprudence
A. Identifying the Source of Discrimination
Although proof of intent is unsuited for equal protection analy-
sis, the Supreme Court has persisted in requiring evidence of its
existence to establish a violation of the equal protection clause. 89 As
has been shown, neither discriminatory motivation nor its nexus to
disproportionate impact can be readily or accurately proved.90 Un-
like its successful utilization in common law, use of intent in equal
protection analysis fails to satisfy the need for a reliable means of
ascertaining an actor's relationship to the incidence of the racially
disproportionate impact of a law.
Instead of assisting plaintiffs in-alerting courts to the nuances of
discrimination, the intent rule raises the threshold of a prima facie
case to a level at which only the most marked instances of discrimi-
nation are actionable. By restricting access to a court's remedial
power, however, the intent rule succeeds in fulfilling its second pur-
pose at common law-distinguishing mere adventitious instances of
wrongdoing from deliberate wrongdoing. Only discrimination per-
petrated by malfeasance is actionable. In this second common-law
capacity, the rule of intent profoundly affects the Supreme Court's
posture toward equal protection claims, diminishing the Court's role
as the primary guardian against deprivations of equal protection
under the law without abrogating the Court's avowed commitment
to the protection of civil rights.
B. Use of Intent as a Measure of Wrongdoing
The second use of intent in common law arises from what Pro-
fessor Fuller has called "the morality of law."' A law that provides
rights for any group of people also creates a duty in the others to
89. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), cited with approvalin Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240-41 (1976).
90. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
91. L. FULLER, supra note 13, at 167. See also Kamer, From Denver To Dayton.- The
Development Of A Theory Of Equal Frotection Remedies, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 382, 389 (1977)
(this fault concept is applied to interdistrict remedies and is named the "unclean hands" re-
quirement).
refrain from infringing those rights. 92 Fault is assigned to those who
breach the duty and carries with it burdening sanctions. Intent is a
measure of that fault.
93
The Supreme Court in Morisette v. United States,94 for example,
reversed a conviction of theft under a statute that did not require
intent for culpability on grounds that evidence of criminal intent was
nonetheless necessary to convict. The Court maintained that some
form of intent is a requisite element of a crime since "wrongdoing
must be conscious to be criminal. . . [in order] to protect those who
are not blameworthy in mind from conviction of infamous common-
law crimes." 95 The intent element in the calculus of culpability or
liability proceeds from the assumption that the "wrongdoer" had a
choice and with free will chose conduct that had consequences for
which he is morally blameworthy.96
Proof of intent establishes that an act was more than adventi-
tious. Intent is significant because it leads to the finding of fault and
to the burden of a penalty97 or a judgment to compensate the vic-
tim.9 8 The threshold level of deliberateness necessitated by the in-
92. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions 4s Applied In Judicial Reasoning, 23
YALE L.J. 16, 30-32 (1913).
93. L. FULLER, supra note 13, at 167; 0. HOLMES, supra note 5, at 37, 152-58 (intent is
broadly construed to encompass willfulness as well as inadvertance in the presence of circum-
stances that would put a reasonable person on notice of the imminent danger). See also Free-
man, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law. A Critical Review of
Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978), in which fault theory is thoughtfully
characterized as the logical outgrowth of a perpetration perspective. "Under the fault idea, the
task of antidiscrimination law is to separate from the masses of society those blameworthy
individuals who are violating the otherwise shared norm." Id at 1054. Thus, intent is the
handmaiden of fault theory; only "intentional" discrimination can violate the equal protection
clause.
Fault theory, Freeman observes, nutures complacency about an individual's moral re-
sponsibility. People feel "innocent" until they are proved to have engaged in discrimination.
Fault theory encourages a flight from social responsibility, which leaves an individual resentful
of any burdens that remedies may impose. Id at 1055; Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33
COLUM. L. REV. 55, 56 (1933).
94. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
95. Id at 252. The Court acknowledged that cases exist in which strict liability was
imposed, but emphasized that they were regulatory offenses that arose from enforcement of the
sovereign's police power to protect the public health, safety, and welfare; Id at 254-56, 260-62.
See also Perkins, A Rationale OfMens Rea, 52 HARV. L. REV. 905 (1939).
96. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 746 (1956).
97. 0. HOLMES, supra note 5, at 37. Intent is an actual element in the crime when the act,
performed deliberately, causes harm that the act alone would not have caused. As an element
of attempt, intent is useful in creating the presumption that an act, innocent in itself, will be
followed by other acts accomplishing the crime. 1d. at 76. The element of intent, however,
comprehends more than deliberate acts. Intent may be a component of acts done with such
wanton and willful disregard of their foreseeably harmful consequences that a requirement of
criminal intent exists that is not an element of the crime. Perkins, supra note 95, at 908-14. To
the extent that intent is synonymous with a criminally culpable mental state, intent may be
equated with mens rea for purposes of the discussion in this article.
98. While the primary philosophical justification for the fault principle is grounded in
personal morality, it functions in tort law to compensate victims, not to punish wrongdoers. C.
MCCORMICK, DAMAGES §§ 20, 137 (1935). But see J. SALMOND, TORTS 21 (1953), in which it
is suggested that
Itihe ultimate purpose of the law in imposing liability on those who do harm to others
tent requirement ensures that accidental events over which the actor
had no control do not cause him to be burdened by sanctions. In this
context, intent serves as a cautionary step in a court's faultfinding
process to avoid unjust imposition of penalties.
1. A Limit on Who is Burdened by Remedies. -The Supreme
Court in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education99 reit-
erated this rule in the context of school desegregation when it noted:
"As with any equity case, the nature of the violation determines the
scope of the remedy.' While the purpose of desegregation reme-
dies is not to punish constitutional violations,' nonetheless, bur-
dens are imposed by desegregation remedies. The mere cost of the
fees for the services of a special master, two court-appointed experts,
and an accounting firm in the Cleveland desegregation case of Reed
v. Rhodes"0 2 for example, amounted to $456,428.103 Changes in
school operating procedures are also costly since they may necessi-
tate the purchase of new facilities"° and the creation of orientation
and remedial education programs. ° 5 Most significantly, desegrega-
tion remedies may require massive reorganization of school district
management procedures. Teacher and pupil assignment and school
site plans, for example, often must be reevaluated and altered.'
0 6
Transportation of students may be necessary, requiring the formula-
tion of routes and the ongoing burden of coordinating busing."0 7 So-
cial costs, such as "white flight," may also be considered since they
is to prevent such harm by punishing the doer of it. . . .Pecuniary compensation is
not itself an ultimate object or a sufficient justification of legal liability. It is simply
the instrument by which the law fulfills its purpose of penal coercion.
99. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
100. Id at 16.
101. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 764 (1974) (White, J., dissenting).
102. 422 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
103. Gaumer, Troubles Mountingfor City Schools, Plain Dealer, Dec. 22, 1977, at 12, col.
1.
104. The Detroit-only desegregation plan, which the district court considered and which
was favored by plaintiffs in Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Mich. 1972), required
the transportation of 82,000 pupils and the purchase of 900 school buses. 418 U.S. at 800
(Marshall, J., dissenting). But see A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
GOVERNMENT 81 (1976) (in which it was noted that Milliken is an atypical segregation case
because of the huge number of pupils and school districts implicated in the dispute).
105. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 271-73 (1977).
106. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22-28 (1971);
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 380 F. Supp. 673, 685-88 (D. Colo. 1974). Courts have speculated
that the reorganizational problems created by interdistrict remedies would be considerably
greater than those created by intradistrict remedies. See, e.g., Bradley v. School Bd. of City of
Richmond, 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), in which the court quoted from expert opinion that
stated that an optimum size for a school district exists. Id at 1068. Beyond that size, the
district becomes "unwieldy," id at 1068 n.9, and parent participation in school management
decreases. Id at 1068. The court further noted that interdistrict coordination of school dis-
tricts is only feasible when the separate tax bases are consolidated. Consolidation, however,
threatens the independence of the other functions of local governments. Id
107. Swarm v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 29-31 (1971).
are created by the imposition of the remedy. ' 0 8 While no individuals
are personally burdened with a monetary judgment or with impris-
onment, school desegregation remedies can greatly inconvenience
the managers of a school district and financially burden the taxpay-
ers of a school district. Although school districts are generally con-
sidered agencies of the state government, 1°9 courts have recognized
that the burden of desegregation remedies falls more heavily on the
districts implicated in the remedy." 0
Judicial remedies designed to abolish discriminatory land use
practices are also considered burdensome to the community in which
the remedy is imposed. While the remedy itself may constitute little
more than invalidation of a zoning ordinance,"' it disrupts the de-
velopment plans of those who relied on the ordinance." 2 The cost in
these instances may vary with the degree of reliance on, and the
amount invested in, the development." 3
These judicial remedies may alter the basic structure of the local
government' or the performance of its functions. In addition, they
may financially burden the beneficiaries of the government's serv-
ices.' 15
In the calculus the Supreme Court adopted in Swann, requiring
the extent of the remedy to be commensurate with the scope of the
violation, these burdensome remedies are only warranted by exten-
sive violations." 6 A consequence of this principle will be reluctance
108. But see Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 801 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (white
flight is not a proper factor for courts to consider in evaluating the validity of a remedy). See
also Craven, Further Judicial Commentary. The Impact of Social Science Evidence on the
Judge.- A Personal Comment, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 150, 155 (1975) (suggests that "the
silence" of the majority in Milliken with respect to this point, in conjunction with Justice Mar-
shall's dissent, may mean "that white flight can never be a relevant factor in considering the
appropriate remedy for dismantling a dual school system ....").
109. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 726 n.5, 742 (1972); see generaly I C. ANTIEAU,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW § 2A.22 (1978).
110. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 743-45 (1972); Griffin v. County School Bd. of
Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Bradley v. School Bd. of City of Richmond, 462
F.2d 1058, 1067-70 (4th Cir. 1972).
111. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 82 (1917); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 296 F.
Supp. 266, 268-69 (W.D. Okla. 1969), aif'd, 424 U.S. 284 (1976) (Court ordered the Chicago
Housing Authority to construct integrated housing).
112. See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 262, 270
(1977).
113. Compare id at 262-63, in which the cost is calculated to include more than economic
injury with James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 143 n.4 (1971), in which the cost is specifically
measured in terms of housing rentals and the cost of municipal services.
114. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 296 (1976) (interpreting Milliken v. Bradley, 418
U.S. 717 (1974)).
115. This possibility arises because of the nature of the remedy. See Leubsdorf, Complet-
ing the Desegregation Remedy, 57 B.U. L. REV. 39 (1977).
116. Compare Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189 (1973) with Dayton Bd. of Educ.
v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977). For an alternative formulation, see Fiss, The Jurisprudence
of Busing, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 194 (1975), in which the cost of the remedy is balanced
against the extent of the harm, rather than the extent of the violation. The difference between
the terms by which the cost of the remedy is judged hinges on the distinction between com-
mon-law and public law litigation made by Professor Chayes in his seminal article, The Role of
on the part of the Court to grant such remedies unless the people
burdened by them are clearly "wrongdoers."
2. A Standard By Which A Remedy Is Fashioned-The
Supreme Court has adopted a second requirement for granting these
remedies by its recognition that the standards for determining depri-
vation of a constitutional right must be clear and the remedy must
offer a certain improvement over the policy the local government has
followed.
For example, in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rod-
riguez,"7 the Supreme Court upheld as constitutional the Texas
school financing system that produced markedly disparate school
district expenditures within different districts of the state. 1 8 Justice
Powell, in his opinion for the Court, found no basis for the claim
that the classification by residence was based on wealth because evi-
dence was lacking that the poor were generally concentrated in dis-
tricts with low values of taxable property per pupil." 9 Although the
Court's conclusion is plausible, Justice Marshall noted in dissent that
the correlation between individual wealth and the property tax base
per pupil was much more significant than Justice Powell admitted. 
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While the lack of correlation argument may be of dubious signifi-
the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1284 (1976). Common-law dis-
putes are those that arise between private parties about private rights, which are settled by a
determination of fault, see L. FULLER, supra note 13, at 167, while the purpose of public law
litigation is to vindicate constitutional or statutory policies, Chayes, supra at 1284, without
assigning fault regarding who is right or wrong. Id at 1293.
The language of the Supreme Court in Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 296 (1976),
suggests that the Court has conscientiously avoided the use of the wrongdoer-fault theory of
common law in this "public law" litigation.
The District Court's desegregation order in Milliken was held to be an impermissible
remedy not because it envisioned relief against a wrongdoer extending beyond the
city in which the violation occurred but because it contemplated a judicial decree
restructuring the operation of local governmental entities that were not implicated in
any constitutional violation.
The Court's conclusion, however, indicates that a dignitary interest exists nonetheless. The
Court reasoned that those entities to which no wrong is attributed should not be implicated as
parties to the dispute. The Court implied that private party status is attributable to local gov-
ernmental entities that have obligations to provide essential services to people residing within
their borders. See generally Goldstein, A Swann Songfor Remedies: Equitable Relief in the
Burger Court, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1978).
See also Kurland, Equal Educational Opportunity: The Limits of Constitutional Jurispru-
dence Undefined 35 U. CHi. L. REV. 583, 596-99 (1968), in which it is suggested that a court's
social policy decision based on the equal protection clause must meet at least two of three basic
criteria to be effective. First, the constitutional standard by which the decision of the court is
made must be simple. Second, the courts must also fashion enforceable decisions. Last, "pub-
lic acquiescence" of the principle embodied in the decision must exist.
Arguably, the implementation of school desegregation decisions, for example, satisfies the
second and third criteria. School desegregation decisions fail the first test of simplicity, how-
ever, if they are to be judged by the clarity of the intent rule and the extent of disagreement
over its interpretation.
117. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
118. Id at 15 n.38.
119. Id at 22-23, 25-27.
120. Id at 95 n.56.
cance, Justice Powell went further to buttress the Court's deference
to the state legislature by questioning whether the minimum educa-
tion provided by the state was so inadequate that it created a consti-
tutional violation. 12  He further extended the Court's deference by
confessing that "[i]n such a complex arena [as fiscal and educational
policy] in which no perfect alternatives exist, the Court does well not
to impose too rigorous a standard of scrutiny ... 22 In effect, the
Court deferred to the state's school finance system because no stan-
dard existed by which to measure the deprivation and there were no
"perfect alternatives" with which to eliminate the educational dis-
parity.
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Thus, these broad social remedies for violations of the equal
protection clause must meet two criteria. First, the degree of the
burden imposed by the local government must be commensurate
with the extent of the violation. Second, standards must exist by
which a violation can be determined and alternatives fashioned.
C The Behavioral Dimension of Intent
The Supreme Court, in its application of the intent rule, clearly
abides by these two criteria in choosing the appropriate remedy.
Since the finding of a violation of the equal protection clause re-
quires proof of discriminatory intent, the violation must have a be-
havioral element. In addition, disparities under the law in treatment
of or in access to resources that occur along racial lines but to which
121. Id at 24.
122. Id at 41. See also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247 n.13 (1976), in which the
Court showed deference to the District of Columbia Police Department by admitting its reluc-
tance to scrutinize rigorously the qualifying test since "[ilt appears beyond doubt by now that
there is no single method for appropriately validating employment tests ..... Bradley v.
School Bd. of City of Richmond, 462 F.2d 1058, 1066 (4th Cir. 1972).
Implicit in this deference is an admission by the Court that the services provided by a
local government are unique. The judiciary interferes with the delivery of these services reluc-
tantly. When the method of delivering these services is consistent over a period of years, the
presumption is created that the method is nondiscriminatory; because were it discriminatory, it
is presumed that the electorate would have altered it previously. But see United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. i, 55 (1973) (private suit). Cf. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
123. But see Yudof, Equal Educational Opportunity and the Courts, 51 TEX. L. REV. 411
(1973), in which it is urged that it is inappropriate to create equal protection remedies to equal-
ize the result of schooling. Therefore, standards by which to measure deprivation are irrele-
vant. Because of the functional limitations of courts in considering matters of broad school
policy, see, e.g., Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 336 (N.D. 111. 1968). afd sub nom.,
McGinnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969), and because of the intangibility of the relevant
social science data, Yudof suggests that measuring equal educational opportunity by educa-
tional achievement is speculative. See generally Bell, On Meritocracy and Equality, 29 THE
PUBLIC INTEREST 64-68 (1972). Yudof concluded that the Rodriquez Court relied on a variant
of equal outcome analysis that placed an undue burden on the plaintiffs to establish that an-
other method of financing would inevitably lead to better-educated students. Instead, Yudof
asserted that this approach ignores the "ethical underpinnings of the equal protection clause"
that are concerned with assuring rationality in government and freedom from governmental
stigmatization. Yudof, supra at 504.
no conscious intent can be attributed are not judicially remediable.
The absence of intent makes the satisfaction of these criteria impos-
sible. Absent evidence of intent, no assessment can be made and no
assurance can be given that the burdens of a remedy are commensu-
rate with the extent of the violation. Furthermore, the lack of proof
of intent may deny the court a standard by which to detect the con-
stitutional violation and a guideline for predicting the effectiveness
of a proposed remedy. Thus, the element of intent distinguishes not
only disparities that are violative from those not violative of the
Constitution, but also disparities that are remediable from those that
are not.'24 The de facto-de jure distinction,'25 from which a consti-
tutional violation is determined, 26 turns on the existence of discrimi-
natory intent.'27
The distinction, however, is of limited efficacy since its founda-
tion in intent is an inaccurate measure of a state's complicity in the
perpetration of racial disparities. 28 In addition, the distinction be-
tween de facto and de jure disparities is a conclusion merely denot-
ing that an instance of discrimination is found in law, and thus
prima facie unconstitutional, or exists in fact, and thus merely unfor-
tunate. The distinction reveals none of the considerations a court
makes in distinguishing lawful from unlawful discrimination. As a
conclusion of an intent analysis that is at best inaccurate, the de facto
or de jure label fails to describe a court's thinking or to enlighten the
public regarding the state of the law.'2 9
124. This statement is consistent with the observation that the finding of a constitutional
violation often follows proof of discriminatory intent, see notes 28-32 and accompanying text
supra and the grant of a remedy almost always follows from the finding of a violation. See,
e.g., Milliken v. Bradley (I), 418 U.S. 717, 738 (1974); Milliken v. Bradley (II), 433 U.S. 267
(1977). While the need for a remedy may be established by a finding of a constitutional viola-
tion, the extent of the remedy remains a matter of judicial discretion. See note 116 supra.
125. Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1971).
126. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976). The Court, in Keyes v. School Dist.
No. 1,413 U.S. 189, 209 (1973), in which the de facto-de jure distinction was first fully articu-
lated, refused to decide the question of whether de facto segregation may also be a constitu-
tional violation under some circumstances. Id at 212. The Court's decision in Davis,
however, answered that question in the negative. The Davis Court interpreted Keyes as enun-
ciating the "basic equal protection principle that the invidious quality of a law claimed to be
racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose." 426
U.S. at 240. After Davis, a showing of de jure discrimination appears essential to establish a
constitutional violation.
Furthermore, a finding of de jure discrimination actually does no more than shift the
burden of proof to the defendants to show that the "monochromatic result" could be caused by
nondiscriminatory behavior. See notes 30-31 and accompanying text supra. The shifting of
the burden, however, almost inevitably results in the finding of a constitutional violation. See
notes 30-32 and accompanying text supra.
127. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973).
128. See notes 86-91 and accompanying text supra.
129. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189, 214-17, 219-36 (1973). Justices Doug-
las and Powell dissented from the decision to maintain the de facto-de jure distinction. Justice
Powell opined that "[tihe results of litigation--often arrived at subjectively by a court endeav-
oring to ascertain the subjective intent of school authorities . -will be fortuitous, unpre-
dictable, and even capricious." Id at 233.
1. An Alternative to De Facto-De Jure Distinction. -The
Court's use of intent in equal protection jurisprudence has created a
more functional dichotomy. Violations for which remedies can be
prescribed by meeting the Court's criteria 3 ° are distinguished from
violations for which remedies cannot be fashioned. The distinction
is between what may be called behavioral violations of the Constitu-
tion and systemic violations.
Behavioral violations arise as a result of the action of an identi-
fiable decisionmaker. Systemic violations are attributable only to
broad economic and social changes within the community or to past
decisionmakers whose remoteness in time attenuates their influence
on current decisions to a level below constitutional significance. Be-
cause behavioral violations that contain the element of intent are
caused by volitional acts having an identifiable source, they are more
remediable than systemic violations.' 3' Behavioral violations resem-
ble the common-law tortious and criminal acts that may be deterred
by sanctions or enjoined by injunction. 32 Intent analysis identifies
these pronounced instances of discrimination and clearly defines the
extent of the discrimination. Remedies can be easily formulated ac-
cording to the guideline that the proof of intent has delineated.
For example, courts have traditionally recognized a school
board's use of certain tactics to be particularly discriminatory and
thus evidence of wrongful intent. The use of optional zones, the
gerry mandering of student attendance zones, or the excessive use of
mobile classroom units readily connotes discriminatory intent to
many courts. 133 Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in
Higgins v. Board of Education 34 recognized the absence of the
"more commonly used or classic segregative techniques found in
130. See notes 1-3, 116-24 and accompanying text supra.
131. This behavioral-systemic distinction may be likened to the dichotomy, articulated by
Professor Fiss, of process-oriented versus result-oriented approaches to the interpretation of
"antidiscrimination laws." Fiss, The Fate of An Idea Whose Time Has Come.- Antdiscrimina-
ion Law in the Second Decade After Brown v. Board of Education, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 742
(1974). The process-oriented approach prescribes purification of the decisionmaking process,
"interpreted as a ban against basing a decision on certain forbidden criteria .. " Id at 764.
Result-oriented remedies seek achievement of a certain result, such as the "improvement of the
economic and social position of the protected group." Id
The process-oriented approach, which may be analogized to the behavioral analysis, ad-
mits that social and economic changes may occur as an incident to the primary purpose of
"purifying the process" by discouraging undesirable behavior. Id at 766. But these changes
do not require special justification as they would if they were the primary purpose of a result-
oriented remedy. Only elimination of the undesirable behavior must be justified when a be-
havioral remedy is granted. The justification is readily found in the unfairness of discrimina-
tion, judging a person by criteria unrelated to the quality of performance. Id at 767.
132. 0. HOLMES, supra note 5, at 37.
133. See, e.g., Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580, 586-97 (lst Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 963 (1975); Oliver v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178, 183-85 (6th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 303 F. Supp. 279, 290 (D. Colo.
1969), modoed, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). See generally Note, supra note 7, at 160-65.
134. 508 F.2d 779 (6th Cir. 1974).
other cases" as significant in finding discriminatory intent lacking in
Grand Rapids.'35 Similar land use practices such as racially exclu-
sive zoning,'36 denial of building permits in an area zoned for that
construction, or ordinances setting a minimum cost of construc-
tion 3 7 of residential structures 38 have been recognized by courts as
evidencing discriminatory intent. Behavioral violations are charac-
terized by specific practices for which no permissible justification can
be inferred. They are instances of manifest discrimination that are
readily enjoined or altered.
Systemic violations are caused by disparities along racial lines
that arise from either countless or unidentifiable sources.' 39 A con-
fluence of factors may function over a period of time to precipitate
the disparities. Systemic violations are either not attributable to an
identifiable and definite source or not subject to any clear remedy.
Recent Supreme Court opinions illustrate this concept of sys-
temic violations. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Milliken v.
Bradley, 140 for example, concludes that the issue before the Court is
"the appropriate exercise of federal equity jurisdiction" since the
Court affirmed the lower court's findings that a violation of the equal
protection clause existed. 14  Justice Stewart maintained, however,
that the extent of the violation failed to reach beyond the Detroit city
limits.' 42 He dismissed as "unknown and perhaps unknowable,"
factors that he acknowledged contributed to the "growing [use] of
Negro schools."' 143 Justice Stewart concluded that factors such as
"in-migration, birth rates, economic changes, or cumulative acts of
135. Id at 787.
136. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (segregation within residential ar-
eas held perpetuated by an ordinance permitting the majority of each block to control its land
use in all-white areas); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974)
(ordinance held discriminatory that prohibited the construction of any new multiple-family
dwellings, including a proposed federally subsidized low-to-moderate income integrated
townhouse development); Anderson v. Forest Park, 239 F. Supp. 576 (W.D. Okla. 1965)
(buffer zone created by unusually severe building requirements struck down). But cf. Deer-
field Park Dist. v. Progress Dev. Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 132, 137-38, 174 N.E.2d 850, 855 (1961)
(condemnation of open housing subdivisions for use as parks with the clear purpose of racial
discrimination nonetheless upheld as a legitimate exercise of eminent domain).
137. See, e.g., Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970); Crow v. Brown,
332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), a'dper curiam, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972).
138. See, e.g., County Comm'rs v. Ward, 186 Md. 330, 46 A.2d 684 (1946); Brookdale
Homes, Inc. v. Johnson, 123 N.J.L. 602, 10 A.2d 477 (Sup. Ct. 1940), a f'd, 126 N.J.L. 516, 19
A.2d 868 (1941) (per curiam); Appeal from Ordinance, Borough of Speers, 28 Wash. Co. 221
(Pa. C.P. 1948).
139. Because the Supreme Court is the final interpreter of the United States Constitution,
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), when the Court does not conclude that
certain racial disparities violate the Constitution, no violation actually exists. The term "sys-
temic violation" connotes disparities sufficiently gross to rise to the level of constitutional mag-
nitude-ie., disparities that would amount to a constitutional violation if reason existed to
attribute the disparity to discriminatory intent.
140. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
141. ld at 753.
142. Id at 755-56.
143. Id at 756 n.2.
private racial fears" cannot be addressed by federal courts until evi-
dence exists that the state or its political subdivisions have acted to
cause the situation to exist."4
The exercise of federal equity jurisdiction to remedy these sys-
temic violations requires evidence of intent as shown by a nexus be-
tween official action and the systemic factors. Since the source of
these factors is unknown, however, no nexus can be found. The fac-
tors are perceived by courts as necessarily operating independently
of official action.
The Court in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous-
ing Development Corp. "' also suggested the existence of a behav-
ioral-systemic distinction by the criteria it articulated as necessary to
evidence intent. Absent a clear pattern of racial disparity that is un-
explainable on grounds other than race,'46 the Court listed such fac-
tors as "a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes...
[a] sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision [and]
• . .[any] contemporary statements by members of the decisionmak-
ing body . . ." as having probative value in evidencing intent.'47
These factors, each of which contain a behavioral component, may
be contrasted with the Court's reasoning in finding that the Arling-
ton Heights zoning board failed to demonstrate discriminatory in-
tent. The Village was zoned for single family, residential use in
1959. A provision was adopted in 1962 that a buffer zone be main-
tained between the residential property zoned for single families and
any subsequent commercial or multi-family developments. The de-
nial of a zoning change to the Metropolitan Housing Corporation for
construction of low and moderate income housing probably bore
more heavily on the blacks who would have entered the previously
racially homogeneous development. In finding that this denial of a
zoning change was not discriminatory, the Court reasoned that the
buffer policy was adopted too long ago and applied too consistently
for the Court to "infer discriminatory purpose."'
' 48
Such a calculus recognizes only deliberate acts as evidencing in-
tent and ignores the possibility that policies can become obsolete,
perpetuating racial disparities in the changing community. Since
systemic violations arise from societal changes over a period of time,
they are not considered in the intent analysis. 149 These systemic vio-
144. Id
145. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
146. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). See also notes 40-49 and ac-
companying text supra.
147. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 267-68
(1977).
148. Id at 270.
149. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), in which the Court
recognized that "growing disparities in population and taxable property between districts were
lations will not be addressed because they lack a behavioral compo-
nent upon which the Court may focus its remedy. Since the cause of
these systemic factors is unknown, the intent necessary to prove a
constitutional violation is undetectable. Only behavioral factors
serve as evidence of a constitutional violation.
The finding of a violation ultimately turns on whether a remedy
can be fashioned to redress the wrong. 5 ° The common-law reme-
dies of damages and injunctions cannot be applied when the sources
of the systemic factors are "unknown or unknowable" since there
will be no wrongdoer against whom the damages can be assessed or
whose behavior can be deterred or enjoined. Intent functions in con-
stitutional law, as it does in common law, to ensure that only those
clearly at fault are burdened by the remedies. By its use of the intent
rule, the Supreme Court has essentially provided that a finding of a
violation of the equal protection clause turns on the manageability
and burdensomeness of the remedies that would be fashioned to re-
dress the wrong.
2. Intent Analysis Applied to Schooling and Land Use as Op-
posed to Legislative Districting and Jury Selection. -The degree to
which the feasibility of the remedy influences the Court's finding of a
violation is evident when the Court's posture in the school segrega-
tion and land use areas is compared with its stance in the legislative
apportionment and juror discrimination areas. The Court has been
reluctant to correct racial disparities in the education and zoning ar-
eas without evidence of substantial wrongdoing' 5 ' and without clear
standards for discerning the violation and fashioning the appropriate
responsible in part for increasingly notable differences in levels of local expenditure for educa-
tion." [d at 8. Notwithstanding this acknowledgement of the systemic cause of the disparity,
the Court refused to remedy inequality, offering as its reason, inter alia, that no standards exist
by which to prove that a constitutional violation exists and by which a remedy can be fash-
ioned. See notes 116-23 and accompanying text supra.
150. It is not a recent conclusion that a court's finding of illegality may depend on the
existence of a manageable remedy. As Professor Shipman noted of the common-law forms of
action: "The general principles of the common law, respecting remedies, rights, and liability
for wrongs, have been evolved by inquiring whether the facts of the case were covered by any
recognized form. .. of remedy." B. SHIPMAN, COMMON LAW PLEADING 55 (3d ed. 1923).
But this thinking has purportedly become obsolete with the adoption and use of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. See also Chayes, supra note 116, at 1293, in which it is suggested
that a characteristic of public law litigation, of which desegregation and land use disputes are a
part, id at 1284, is that the right asserted and the remedy claimed are disconnected; that "[tihe
form of relief does not flow ineluctably from the liability determination, but is fashioned ad
hoc." Id at 1284-85.
The Court's action in the school desegregation and zoning areas is certainly far more
flexible than the pigeonholes of the common-law forms of action. The thesis of this article
suggests, however, that the disjunction of right and remedy is not nearly as distinct as Profes-
sor Chayes suggests. The recognition of rights continues to be contingent on the existence of
remedies. Furthermore, any attenuation of the present connection between right and remedy
has reached an institutional limit beyond which the Supreme Court, in apparent fear of acting
as a "super legislature," is unwilling to move.
151. See notes 99-117 and accompanying text supra.
remedy.' 52 The Court, however, has demonstrated a greater willing-
ness to remedy disparities arising in legislative representation and
jury composition. The difference in the judicial posture toward these
areas is coincident with the different types of remedies they warrant
and the standards available for detecting a violation and fashioning
the remedy. The correlation of the judicial posture to the remedies
available may be more than coincidental. It can be explained by the
purposes for which the Court seems to have persisted in using the
common-law rule of intent.
Reapportionment differs most strikingly from the school deseg-
regation and zoning areas in its application of an easily managed
standard by which a court can detect equal protection violations and
order a remedy to be fashioned. In its keystone decision of Reynolds
v. Sims, '5 the Supreme Court first held that "as a basic constitu-
tional standard, the Equal Protection Clause requires that the seats
in both houses of a bicameral state legislature must be apportioned
on a population basis."' 54 The Court nonetheless allowed that some
deviation from a strict population standard would be constitution-
ally permissible,' 55 but it ruled out history, geographical considera-
tions, and "economic or other sorts of group interests" as permissible
justifications for the deviation.' 56
These systemic factors are cognizable since the calculus for
measuring fair and effective representation' 57 is guided by a norm of
equality: the simple standard of one person-one vote.'58 While de-
bate still rages concerning the extent of the deviation permissible,
59
the standard provides courts with guidelines for detecting constitu-
tional violations and for fashioning appropriate remedies. 60 Given
152. See notes 117-24 and accompanying text supra.
153. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
154. Id at 568.
155. Id. at 577-78.
156. Id at 579-80. See also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 250 n.5 (1962) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
157. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565-66 (1964).
158. See, e.g., Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376
U.S. 1, 18 (1964). The standard of "one man-one vote" that echoes throughout the reappor-
tionment cases requires each state to make "an honest and good faith effort to construct dis-
tricts .. as nearly of equal population as is practicable." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577
(1964).
159. For an account of this debate, see Note, Fair And Effective Representation.- Power To
The People, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 190 (1974); Note, Reapportionment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1226,
1250 (1966).
160. Justice Frankfurter, in his dissent in Reynolds v. Sims, recognized the significance of
the majority's decision, that the "right to vote" was "diluted," "debased," and "impaired" by
unequal apportionment, by observing that:
One cannot speak of "debasement" or "dilution" of the value of a vote until there is
first defined a standard of reference as to what a vote should be worth. What is
actually asked of the Court. . . is to choose among competing bases of representa-
tion - ultimately, really, among competing theories of political philosophy. ...
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 300 (1962). See also Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases- One
Person, One Vote - One Vote, One Value, in 1964 SUPREME COURT REV. I, 84-85 (Kurland
the presence of such a standard, an intent rule is unnecessary to
guide a court in finding violations that may be remediable. Indeed,
until recently, no requirement of intent has been applied to reappor-
tionment claims. 161
In City of Mobile v. Bolden, 62 however, the Supreme Court re-
quired that discriminatory intent be shown in support of a claim that
at-large election of city commissioners unfairly diluted black voter
strength in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. In his plurality opinion, Justice Stewart suggested that
the application of the discriminatory intent requirement to voting
cases, apparently including reapportionment cases, is wholly consis-
tent with the Court's precedents.
63
To reach this conclusion, Justice Stewart found evidence of dis-
criminatory intent in prior voting rights decisions, such as White v.
Regester, 164 in which the Court based its finding that the equal pro-
tection clause had been violated exclusively on "systemic" factors
that had restricted access of minority groups to the political process.
No finding of discriminatory intent, however, was made in the White
decision. Justice Stewart's liberal reading of White v. Regester fur-
ther blurs the distinction between discriminatory intent and discrimi-
natory impact. Besides citing precedent of questionable value to
support his view that discriminatory intent must be proved in voting
rights cases, Justice Stewart provided no other explanation for the
Court's judgment.
Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in Mobile may offer
some guidance to the direction the Court may take in future voting
rights decisions. After assuming that proof of intent is a prerequisite
to proving vote dilution, Justice Blackmun concurred in the Court's
judgment, reversing the lower court's findings that the Constitution
had been violated. He believed the district court's order altering the
form of the city's government from a commission to a mayor-council
system exceeded the proper bounds of its remedial discretion;
"[E]ven a temporary alteration of a long-established form of munici-
pal government is a drastic measure for a court to take."'' 65 Justice
ed.). In establishing a standard by which to judge the equality of voting rights, the Court chose
a democratic model of government as an ideal against which it could fashion effective reme-
dies. No such coherent model exists in the land use and school desegregation areas that would
set a goal for the judiciary toward which manageable and effective remedies may be directed.
See Yudof, supra note 123. In the absence of a theory that envisions how ideal schools and
land use would appear, the intent rule functions as a standard to guide the Court's decision-
making.
161. But see Paige v. Gray, 538 F.2d 1108, 1110(5th Cir. 1976).
162. 100 S. Ct. 1490 (1980).
163. Id at 1499-1500.
164. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
165. 100 S. Ct. at 1508.
Blackmun's position would herald a reevaluation of the burden of
voting rights remedies.
Justice Stevens also concurred in the Court's judgment, failing
to find that the evidence before the district court proved a denial of
equal protection. Rather than apply a discriminatory intent stan-
dard to judge the constitutionality of the actions of political deci-
sionmakers, however, he would focus on the "objective effects" of
the political decisions, looking more to disproportionate impact than
discriminatory intent. 166 Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall dis-
sented, each in opposition to the application of a discriminatory in-
tent standard to voting rights claims.
The effect of the Mobile judgment on equal protection jurispru-
dence is uncertain. Because a bare majority of the Justices favor re-
quiring proof of discriminatory intent in voting rights cases, 167 the
Mobile judgment may mark the introduction of this standard into
voting rights cases. This apparent shift in the Court's position may
have resulted from a reassessment, as Justice Blackmun undertook to
do in his concurrence, of the burden that voting rights remedies
place on the functioning of municipal governments. The continued
Court interest and particularly that of Justice Blackmun, in the dis-
ruptiveness of equal protection remedies suggests that the common-
law attributes of an intent requirement remain an active concern in
the Court's deliberations.
The extent to which the remedies burden the community on
which they are imposed serves to distinguish the Court's treatment of
reapportionment from the school desegregation and land use areas.
In contrast with school desegregation and land use remedies, which
typically disrupt the delivery of services by the local government and
are costly to implement, '68reapportionment remedies require only
that district lines be redrawn to meet the one person-one vote stan-
dard. 169 Neither reorganization of local government nor costly im-
plementation is necessary. 70  Consequently, it is unnecessary to
measure the scope of the remedy by the extent of the wrongdoing
since the remedy is not characteristically burdensome, as it is in the
school desegregation and land use areas. 71 Reapportionment reme-
dies may have social and political significance to the extent that they
alter the proportional representation in local government within a
166. Id at 1512.
167. Justices supporting the present use of the discriminatory intent requirement are Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens. See City of Mobile v.
Bolden, 100 S.Ct. 1490 (1980).
168. See notes 99-115 and accompanying text supra.
169. See Note, Reapportionment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1228, 1266-83 (1966).
170. But see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 327 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Paige v.
Gray, 538 F.2d 1108 (5th Cir. 1976).
171. See notes 99-115 and accompanying text supra.
state or county, but they do not necessarily disrupt the daily activi-
ties of a community as may the school desegregation and land use
remedies.
These differences between the availability of standards and the
burdensomeness of remedies may account, at least partially, 72 for
the Court's more active role toward reapportionment than toward
desegregation and land use discrimination. This readiness to grant
apportionment remedies is most readily illustrated by the Court's
disregard for the significance of local government boundary lines,
the integrity of which the Court adamantly respected in Milliken v.
Bradley. Although the Milliken Court admonished that "the notion
that school district lines may be casually ignored or treated as a mere
administrative convenience is contrary to the history of public edu-
cation in our country,"' 173 reapportionment remedies entail the
wholesale alteration of local boundary lines.' 74  The lines may be
172. The Court's activism in reapportionment may also be attributed to the judicial solici-
tude accorded the right to enfranchisement that malapportionment was held to abridge in
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 133, 555-56 (1964). But see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 301 (1962)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Malapportionment challenges a fundamental principle of repre-
sentative government-that the majority, not a minority, should govern. The injury perpe-
trated by malapportionment was well described in Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 270 F.2d 594, 612
(5th Cir. 1959) (Wisdom, J., concurring), rev'd, 364 U.S. 339 (1960): "[I1n a democratic coun-
try nothing is worse than disfranchisement. And there is no such thing as being just a little bit
disfranchised. A free man's right to vote is a full right to vote or is no right to vote."
Furthermore, enfranchisement is recognized as a fundamental right in American society,
but neither safe housing, Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972), nor education, San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30 (1973), are recognized as fundamen-
tal rights.
Finally, both discrimination in the selection of a jury and the malapportionment of legis-
lative districts directly implicate a governing body, impairing its legitimacy. Neither land use
discrimination nor school segregation touch basic governmental institutions so intimately.
This distinction may also account, in part, for the differences in the Court's posture toward
discrimination in these four areas.
173. 418 U.S. 717, 741 (1974).
174. See Note, supra note 169. But cf. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976), in which
the Court allowed a metropolitan remedy to be imposed on the Chicago Housing Authority
(CHA) and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). CHA and HUD
were found to have deliberately selected public housing sites in Chicago that avoided the
placement of black families in white neighborhoods. The Court held that a metropolitan rem-
edy was not per se impermissible. Milliken was construed in Gautreaux as merely holding that
the federal courts lack the power to interfere with the operation of state political entities not
"implicated in unconstitutional conduct." Id at 298. The Court buttressed this interpretation
by maintaining that "a judicial order directing relief beyond the boundary lines of Chicago
will not necessarily entail coercion of uninvolved governmental units, because both CH,4 and
HUD have the authority to operate outside the Chicago city limits. " Id (emphasis added) (foot-
note omitted). According to this reasoning, the legal authority to act across city lines creates a
presumption that the repercussions of discrimination are coextensive with that authority and
that a court's remedy may be equally broad. No consideration is given to the actual extent of
the discrimination. The finding of the district court that metropolitan relief was unwarranted
because "the wrongs were committed within the limits of Chicago," id at 291, was dismissed,
not on the factual ground that it inaccurately assessed the effects of discrimination, but on the
reasoning that relief should be as extensive as the potential discriminatory behavior. The area
over which CHA and HUD may have actually discriminated includes the entire metropolitan
area in which they were authorized to act.
Thus, the Court in Gautreaux continued to measure the invidious discrimination by the
extent of the behavior that may have caused it. No effort to consider nonbehavioral factors is
merely less significant during reapportionment because their altera-
tion does not necessarily disrupt the functioning of the local govern-
ment as the Court feared it would, for example, in school
desegregation. 175
The same analysis applies as readily to discrimination in jury
selection. Jury selection is accomplished by well-outlined proce-
dures that are administered by a few, identifiable people. 7 6 The op-
portunities for discrimination coincide with the points at which the
administrators have discretion in managing the selection.' Racial
disparities are attributable either to the random selection process or
to the people who administer the process. In jury selection, unlike
school desegregation and land use, racial disparities are easily attrib-
uted to an identifiable source. The Court in Alexander v. Louisi-
ana178 was so certain that the range of sources of the racial disparity
in jury composition was limited that it arrived at its conclusion by
deduction. No discriminatory actions were proved. Because the ra-
cial disparity was gross, 179 however, the Court deduced that it was
more likely caused by the commissioners than by the random selec-
tion process. 180  Discriminatory intent was inferred from the com-
missioners' opportunity to discriminate by use of a racial designation
included on the juror questionnaire. 8 '
In the finite jury selection process in which the possibility that
systemic factors will cause racial disparities is minimal, the Court
more readily infers discriminatory intent from such disparities. In
Arlington Heights, the Court acknowledged that a lesser burden of
proof may be appropriate in the jury selection context.'82 Although
apparent. The mere authority to act beyond city boundaries implicates the surburban Chicago
housing. Gautreaux strains the distinction the Court has made between behavioral and sys-
temic violations in order to permit the formulation of a broad remedy to address a dramatic
instance of invidious discrimination. See also Kanner, supra note 91, in which two prerequi-
sites to interdistrict relief are discerned from Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). An
"unclean hands" condition requires proof that both jurisdictions committed invidious discrim-
ination, while a disproportionate impact condition requires only that the discrimination in one
district cause a "segregative effect" in another district. Kanner, supra at 389.
175. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 743 (1974).
176. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 491-92 (1977); Alexander v. Louisiana,
405 U.S. 625, 627-28 (1972); Arnold v. North Carolina, 376 U.S. 773 (1964).
177. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 492 (1977); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405
U.S. 625, 630-32 (1972).
178. 405 U.S. 625 (1972).
179. Id at 627-28.
180. Id at 630-32.
181. Id at 632.
182. "Because of the nature of the jury-selection task ... we have permitted a finding of
constitutional violation even when the statistical pattern does not approach the extremes of
Yick Wo or Gomillion." Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 266 n.13 (1977).
The Supreme Court in City of Mobile v. Bolden, 100 S.Ct. 1490 (1980), dismissed an
analogy of the district court between voting dilution and racially exclusionary jury cases.
Bolden v. City of Mobile, 423 F. Supp. 384, 398 (S.D. Ala. 1976). The Court observed that
jury cases "typically have involved a consistent pattern of discrete official actions that demon-
intent may be readily inferred from the circumstances, the intent rule
remains a necessary guide to the courts in their scrutiny of the jury
selection process. Unlike the reapportionment area, in which the
standard by which to measure a violation and to fashion a remedy is
clear, jury composition 83 is not subject to standards that propose an
ideal composition. 8 4 In the absence of that standard, the intent rule
guides the Court in its assessment of "wrongdoing" and in its deter-
mination of the manageability of remedies to redress the wrong. 85
The intent rule functions differently in different contexts. When
standards by which the Court can discern violations and fashion
remedies are minimal or when the remedies are typically burden-
some, as in the school desegregation and land use areas, the intent
rule functions as a surrogate standard. The use of the intent rule as a
standard colors the Court's analysis in its judgment that only those
events that have a behavioral component are unconstitutional. In
effect, the operation of the intent rule restricts the Court's recogni-
tion of constitutional violations to those "wrongs" most remediable.
When manageable standards exist to guide the Court's analysis and
the remedies do not severely burden local government, as in the re-
apportionment area, the efficacy of the intent analysis may be so
minimal as to make it inoperative.' Despite the absence of standards
to guide the Court, when the "wrongdoing" is well contained and the
remedies are simple, as in the jury selection area, the intent rule op-
erates more flexibly.
While the Court has recognized the failure of the intent rule to
accurately discern a nexus between discriminatory motives and ra-
cial disparities, it has come to appreciate the effect of the rule in
limiting constitutional violations to those actions that are most read-
ily enjoined or deterred. The behavioral-systemic distinction in ef-
fect, if not in name, may supplant the de facto-de jure dichotomy
that has purportedly guided the Court's reasoning since its formula-
tion in Keyes v. School District No. 1 186 The question remains
whether tangible remedies may serve as a more predictable and con-
sistent guide to the Court's thinking than has the intangible element
strated almost to a mathematical certainty that Negroes were being excluded from juries be-
cause of their race." 100 S.Ct. at 1502 n.17.
183. But see Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 636 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring), in
which it is noted that it is a "federal constitutional criteri[on]" that a grand jury as well as a
petit jury must be drawn from a representative cross-section of the community. Justice Doug-
las further urged that "[tihe requirement that a jury reflect a cross-section of the community
occurs throughout our jurisprudence .... " Id
184. See Swarm v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25 (1971) (Court
acknowledges that mathematical rations are permissible as a "starting point in the process of
shaping a remedy, rather than an inflexible requirement.").
185. See note 160 supra.
186. 413 U.S. 189, 209 (1973).
of discriminatory motivation on which the de facto-de jure distinc-
tion rests.
IV. Conclusion
Although intent is useful at common law in identifying a wrong-
doer, that function seems to contravene the avowed purpose of equal
protection jurisprudence of vindicating public rights.'87 The
Supreme Court's persistence in requiring proof of intent for a consti-
tutional violation has infused equal protection analysis with com-
mon-law attributes. This limits the recognition of violations to
incidents in which identifiable "wrongdoers" exist even though the
complexity of equal protection issues makes that identification diffi-
cult, if not impossible. The Court's consideration of whether man-
ageable standards are available to guide its formulation of a remedy
further compounds the difficulty of establishing an equal protection
violation. Consequently, unless a mathematical standard is practica-
ble, as in legislative reapportionment, only clear incidents of official
complicity in perpetrating racial disparities are subject to judicial
remedy.
The use of the intent rule has restricted the Court's intervention
in state activities, leaving primary responsibility for redress of dis-
criminatory acts with the state legislatures. It remains uncertain
whether state legislatures will recognize this judicial posture as a
mandate for legislative action.
187. Chayes, supra note 116, at 1284.
